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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

We know that the Palhet Lao and the
North Vietnamese in Laos nwnber, according to the President's figures-and
the.oe are North Vietnamese-something
on the order of 67,000. They have advanced into and beyond the Plaines des
Jarres and are reportedly within 20 miles
of the Royal Laotian capital of Luang
Prabang.
We know also that as a r esult of the
successes of the Pathet Lao and the North
Vietnamese--they are primru:ily North
Vietnamese successes-t hat an exchange
o! letters has occurred between Prince
Souphanouvong, the leader of the Pathet
Lao, and Prince Souvanna Phowna,
Prime Minister of the Royal Laotian
Government.
The letter sent by Prince Souphanouvong has been received by Prince Souvanna Phouma and, I dare say, that be
and his cabinet are looltlng into the contents with great cru·e at this time.
I assume, also, that what is contained
in that letter has been brought to the
attention of the U.S. Government and
that it, likewise, is giving this matter
careful attention.
I would hope, Mr. President, that the
situation in Le.os could be stabilized
through a meeting between the two
princes, who are halt brothers !or a discussion of the contents o! the letter. It is
to be hoped that some sort of agreement
might be reached which would bring a
degree of peace to a very, very peaceful
people.
In addition, perhaps the International
Contml Q>mmlssion, which is still functioning in Laos, and does maintain contact between the Pathet Lao strongholds
at Samn-eua and Phong Saly, as well as
in the territory under the control of the
Royal Laotian Government, might be
beefed up, that their use as intermediaries would be furthered, and that
whatever services they could offer, to
bring an end to the dl!flcult sUua.tion in
Laos, would be forthcoming.
Furthermore, I join wholeheartedly 1n
the plea. ot the President of the United
States to the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union, the cochairmen of the
Geneva conferees to reconvene that
meeting- to me, it 1s immaterial whether
it is the 196Z or the 1954 meeting-for
the purpose of trying to bring abOut a
guarantee of the neutrality of Laos which
so many of u.s--14 nations, I believ~
agreed to in 1.962.
It is quite );)0661ble that the situation
unless faced up to 1n this manner, or
something approaching it, ma.y well get
out of hand.
I would point out to my colleagues that
at the present time there is a Chinesebuilt road extending from Phong Saly,
one of the Pathet Lao strongholds, in the
northwestern part of Laos through Meng
La, 1n Yunnan, a Chinese province, down
to Muong Sal, wpich 1n looltlng at the
map I would hazard a guess is probably
20 miles from the border of Burma.
There is a,nother road from Meng La
EVENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
in Yunnan extending southward toward
Mr. UA.t'fBF'IELD. Mr. Pres.ldent, in a town called Muong Lo, which would
recent weeks. events in Southeast Asia tie up with the roa.d to Dienbienphu 1n
have eiC&Iated to a point that, I think, Vietnam. In a iOUthwesterly direction,
Calla tol' t:be continued attention of the the roe.c1 exten& from Muong Sal to
Senate, u well as tbe adm1nlst.rat1on.
Muong Houn, and it is within about 30
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miles of the Thai border. According to
my information, it is st!ll being built.
It is estimated there are 8,000 to 10,000
Chinese along this road, mostly in labor
battalions, but with a few antiaircraft
battallons as well, for the protection of
the Chinese roadbuilders.
All of these factors should be taken
into consideration in any disc\l&Sion of
Laos so that the American people will
have the facts laid out before them and
be aware of just what the potential and
possibilities are in that country.
I conunend the President for his showing of forbearance. But I disassociate the
attacks on the Ho Chi Minh trail which
are, in effect, troops of Vietnam and connected with the war in the fighting in
other areas of Laos where, I understand,
although it cannot be proven, that Tha.i
troops have been involved in seeldng to
block the extension of the power o! the
Pathet Lao and Vietnamese.
Then there is the question of Cambodia. Some people seem to be very happy
that Prince Sihanouk has been overthrown and 1s now 1n Peking where statements attributed to him have been issued of late. It is my understanding that
Prince SihanoUk has indicated that as
long as he 1s out of Cambodia, he \Wll
divide his time between Peking and
Moscow.
I regret to see this form of event, because in my opinion Sihanouk was a
very shrewd political leader dedicated
to keeping alive the neutrality and the
entity of Cambodia. He was able to keep
his country in relative peace and stab111ty, as contrasted with the surrounding nations. He did so in most difficult
circumstances because he was pressured
from all borders, from the west by the
Thais, and once in a while by red Khmer
Serai units from the north, by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese, who
number something in the order of 45,000
to 50,000 in the northern province of
Cambodia stretched out !rom the east
border of VIetnam to the west border of
Cambodia at Battam.bang, which borders
on Thailand.
Now we have a deposed prince, living
in Moscow, who has been accused of
having great swns of money in Swiss
banks but the fact is that he has authorized all Swiss banks to disclose the
facts to prove or disprove this charge.
He has been accused of a number of
other things, but ne can never be accused
of his lack of dedication to Cambodia and
its preservation. Before there is too much
rejoicing at his overthrow, it would be
well to bear in mind that of all the countries in Indochina., Cambodia under Sihanouk is the onl:y cow1try into which
we have not poured Lilli• .ns in aid in
recent years and the only country where
we have not h ad Americans fighting and
dying during this u·aglc conflict. What
are we to expect n ow? Aid programs for
Cambodia? An extension of military operations into that country? What would
this Nation gain from that eourse?
I am concerned because with the
overthrow of Prince Sihanoult and his
being establish ed \n I eking, a new situation has developed in Southeast Asia
as far as Cambodia is concerned. I reiterate that It may well be that we were
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too happy with Cambodia's neutrality intend to run the further risk of
at ~1mes. But it was an area 1n which a broadening that war. I hope we w1ll not.
certain degree of stability had been There are American forces close to that
achieved in Southeast Asia.
border in South Vietnam. They w1ll have
If events develop to an extent that the to be protected. The interdiction of the
present situation brings about an expan- Ho Chi Minh Trail will presumably consion of the war or a civU war in Cam- tinue. But I do not believe that this
bodia, I would hope most devoutly that administration has any more intention
this Nation would stay out of it and of bringing any ground combat forces
would not intervene in any way in the into Cambodia than we do of sending
a1fa1rs o1 Cambodia. That we would not them into Laos.
The sooner we get out of the whole
once apJn tall into the trap of extending
aid to one faction and in that way taking embroiled peninsula, the better for all
the ftrst step toward a new involvement. of us.
I am satisfied that the administration
I 'woli1d hope, rather, that this Nation
would do all in i~ powers to keep the is doing everything in its power to ac;war from Spreading beyond its present complish this objective which the Ameri~ and thereby prevent a situation an people want.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
~would req_¢.re an increase in com~t of American forces rather than agree wholeheartedly with what the disthe 'ptia.sed withdrawal that the Presl- tinguished minority leader has just said.
deat has wtsely put into effect up to this I want to assure him that my purpose in
- time.
speaking today is not to criticize the
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the administration, but to try to be constructive and point out pitfalls and danm-.l0r1ty leader yield?
gers which may arise. I am sure the
~- MANSl"lELD. I yield.
M:l'. SCOT'I'. Mr. President. I thank administration is fully aware of them,
the maJority leader for yielding at this but I assume that some comment from
the Senate is welcomed.
time.
I am heartened by what the minority
I think this is the time to make it
clear that, as far as I am concerned, I l~ader said, because It indicates that so
think the d.lstingulshed majority leader far as the joint leadership is concerned
has correctly and accurately stated a there is an identity of views. It 1s unpo~t of vie;w which Americans ought to fortunate t1Jat so many of our people
listen to v~ry carefully and with which have tended to look upon Prince SiI 11nd ~self in broad general agreement. hano'ijk as a playboy. He is a man of
~re has been, ftrst of all, a tendency great ability and great capability, and
to l'l!l'ard Prince Sihanouk as something great energy. He has had to perform a
of a playboy. Yet, underneath that ro.- ~chiavellian feat in keeping Cambodia
tund exterior, there has proven to be a independent and neutral since 1953, bevery shrewd manipula.tor of forces much - cause Cambodia's in<ilependence was
larpr than hi& own ln offering a way achieved even before the Geneva agreeto preaerve this precarious neutr(tlity ments of 1954.
tor Quite a long time.
So the purpose of this exchange as the
There is also .a tendency, I notice, in dlstl.nguished minority leader pointed
dbiCusli1ng the overthrow of Sihanouk to out by implication, is that we ought to
draw t4e assumption that because those be extremely careful. We should not be
who overthrew him appear to be oriented carried away by requests for this or that,
to the West, that this would necessarily not only as far as American personnel are
be a ~()Od thing for · the United States. concerned In both Laos and Cambodia,
It fs a broadening of the war and but also as far as American aid is concerta:lnly would not be a good thing if cerned.
it le&<la to a decision by Peking or MosWe should have learned our lesson and
cow to come1nto that country. The situ- learned 1t well after what happened in
ation ;would be much worse, because no Korea and what has been happening for
matter whether the power which over- all too long, for all too many years in
threw Sihanouk proves to be ·oriented South Vietnam. The figures there of what
to the West or to the East, any power this war has cost us in manpower are
in Cambodia and lndeed the whole na- appalling. The latest figures I have are as
tion can be overt:;!'Own in a matter of of March 19, less than 1 week ago and
hours or days by anyone having the will they indicate that as of then, last Thursto do 1!0.
day, 269,719 Americans were wounded in
This was the nature of Sihanouk. It South Vietnam, 40,947 were killed in
required a rather brlll1ant achievement: combat, and '/,627 were killed in nonHe was able to preserve· this balance for <X>mbat capacities. The total casualties so
1!0 long a time. It is too bad that he far, and they are still increasing, amount
decided to pack hlmsel! oft to Peking to 318,293 as of 1 week ago.
and Moscow. That will let him in for a
This is a high price to pay for an area
lot of travel ~d trava.U.
which is not vital to the security of this
I agree that we were better oft when country and never was. This is a high
we had hl.m keeping Cambodia neutral. Price to pay for a war which was a misIn my jud@lent•.there is not going to take. This 1s a high .Price to pay for a
be· ~ expedfttonary force in Loas. war whicli is a continuing tragedy and
Neither do I JJ61eve there will be any affects all elements of our population. In
cq~ent of Ametil:an ground· forces my opinion, it has had a large role in the
irt.t~·
. development of internal domestic di.1fi. ·~ we 1VDf do notWng to risk the culties in this country. It has taken well
~
.
ffi ~ rir ·by. actions which over $100 billiOn of money to wage this
-we :~- 111 ~to~.
war to which there really is no end in
I - ha>ve lee!\ · no lndtcatJon that we sight at the present time, money which
no~

March

;l (i, J Y70

In large part could better have been u sed
to face up to problems of the ghettos, to
meet the needs of our people, and in that
way to be put to constructive use rather
than destructive use.
I want to commend the administration
for what It is doing in this respect. for
the firmness it 1s showing against advice
I am sure has been advanced that we
get behind this government in Cambodia:
We do not know what kind of a· government it is and only time will tell. In any
event, I hope the admin1strat1on will
show a forbearance in line with congressional amendments that there be no
use of U.S. ground combat troops in
Laos or Cambodia . .
I want to assure the administration.
in my capacity as a Senator from Montana and a.s majority leader, that I w111
continue to do my very best to support
the administration in carrying out the
Nixon policy, wblch I approve 100 percent, of keeping a low profile In our relations with nations not only In Southeast Asla but throughout the world, and
in keeping to the phased withdrawals of
our troops from Vietnam ; and hopefully,
if the oppoo-tunity arises, Cambodia and
Laos notv.rJ.thstanding, that that phased
withdrawa.l can be increased considerably.
The President has tried through the
Geneva accords, through the International Control Commission, and through
private channels, with all means available at hiB command to bring about a
lifting of this shadow wh ich overhangs
all of our lives, to the end that we can
withdraw, lock, stock, and barrel, from all
Southeast Asia. It is my hope that his
efforts will bear fruit and that there will
come a reconvening of the Geneva Conference; and out of that an ironclad
guarantee to which all Geneva nations
would give assent. which would insure
the neutrality of all Southeast Asia. In
this way perhaps peace can be achieved.
If we do not keep our feet on the path
toward this objective, then I can see only
increased costs, increased casualties, and
I think we have h a d enough of both.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President. will the
S enator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to
yield.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I do not
want to prolong this discussion at all,
other than Qnce more to say that the
distinguished majority leader has shown
his judgment and his patriotism mave
hand in hand, as h e indicates his support for the efforts of the admlnistration. He and I both did our very vest
with previous administrations and with
the problems that were presented in foreign policy, to give support. We Jointly
are now doing it again.
I would add only one very small com ment which In no way changes anything
· the majorlty leader said, and that is I
often notice h eadlines to the e!Iect th a t
we are in a new war In Laos. Mr. President, there is n o new war in Laos. Th!"
commitment of Americans In Laos on
the ground. and outside of the air interdictions, has varied in the last several
years between only 1,000 and 1,040 personnel, about one- half of which are
civilians. Since J anuary 20, 1969, dea ths
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in Laos on the ground have amounted
to seven. one mlllta.ry and six civilian.
This doe., not look like a new war.
I say this only to make the point that
we must not have even that many casualties in Cambodia. We must have no
casualties whatever in Cambodia 1! we
can avoid 1':, and the way to avoid It is
to have no commitment in Cambodia, as
the majority leader outlined, and that
is the effort thx:ough many nations to
preserve the neutrality of that troubled
state.
Lthank the Senator.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished minority leader
for his remarks. I must reiterate that
what we are both trying to do Is to be
oomtructive with an admin1stration
whlch did not start the war, b4t which
was saddled, in effect, with a number of
problems connected with it, and a war
wblch seems awfully difficult to di§~ga«e from at this time.
I thank the distinguished minority
leader.
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